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ABSTRACT 
 Insider threat is one of the most pressing threats in the field of information 
security as it leads to huge financial losses by the companies. Most of the proposed 
methods for detecting this threat require expensive and invasive equipment, which 
makes them difficult to use in practice. In this paper, we present non-invasive 
method for detecting insider threat based on stress recognition using user’s keystroke 
dynamics assuming that intruder experiences stress during making illegal actions, 
which affects the behavioral characteristics. Proposed method uses both supervised 
and unsupervised machine learning algorithms. As the results show, stress can 
provide highly valuable information for insider threat detection. 
 
Keywords: Insider threat · Intruder · Stress detection · Keystroke dynamics · 
Machine learning · Anomalies 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In the modern world of information technology, ensuring information security 
is becoming an increasingly difficult task. Despite the enormous efforts of 
companies developing means of effectively countering information threats, for some 
of the threats this task remains unresolved. 
One of the threats that most companies face is the insider threat. This type of 
threat poses the greatest danger due to the huge number of sources generating it and 
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the lack of effective means to counter this threat, as a result of which companies 
suffer huge financial losses. That is why the insider threat or an internal intruder 
threat is relevant and at the moment it is receiving considerable attention from 
researchers in the world of information security. 
The explanation for the lack of sufficient means to counter the threat of an 
internal intruder is the nature of this threat. Even though the result of the actions of 
the internal intruder is obvious, it is very difficult to find informative indicators that 
would allow to detect abnormal behavior of the user of the information system and 
distinguish it from normal. To analyze the behavior, one can use the data of the 
electrocardiogram (ECG) or electroencephalogram (EEG) [1,2,3], body temperature 
[1], skin conductivity [2], eye movement [4] and other biometric indicators. 
However, the methods for obtaining most types of biometric indicators are 
invasive, that is, they require the use of special and expensive equipment in the form 
of sensors and cameras, which are most often in direct contact with the experiment 
participant in the process of data collection. This drawback is the reason that 
methods based on the usage of invasive equipment for obtaining biometric indicators 
are difficult to put into practice. 
At the same time, there are some non-invasive methods of accumulating data 
for behavioral analysis, which are based on the use of very affordable tools, such as 
keyboards and mice, which can be easily found in any office. These low-cost tools 
can act as sensors that provide behavioral information or, in other words, a 
behavioral characteristic consisting of keyboard handwriting, keystrokes, and 
gestures. Behavioral characteristics can be used in solving authentication problems 
[5,6,7,8,9], emotional state detection [10,11,12,13,14,15], as well as in tasks of 
detecting the threat of an internal intruder [16]. 
This work is devoted to the study of methods for detecting an internal intruder 
by identifying the stressful state of the user based on the analysis of the interaction 
with the keyboard and mouse. As in [16], the study is based on testing the 
assumption that behavioral indicators change when an unlawful act is committed by 
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an internal intruder under the influence of an induced stress state. However, unlike 
the work [16], a wider range of features extracted from raw data is used and a larger 
number of algorithms are used to detect threats. 
The first section analyzes the related works. First, a class of works based on 
the use of supervised machine learning algorithms is analyzed, the data sets used are 
considered within each work, and the classification results of the applied algorithms 
are presented. Similarly, a class of works using unsupervised machine learning 
algorithms is considered. Methods for detecting the threat of an internal intruder by 
identifying stress are also considered. 
The second section presents the process of data collection, which includes the 
requirements for scenarios for data collection, proposed scenarios, their description 
and justification for the use of these scenarios. 
The third section describes the process of extracting features from the log 
files, their processing and preprocessing. 
In the fourth section, models of classifiers of abnormal and normal behavior, 
based on supervised machine learning algorithms are considered, the results of 
models evaluations are presented, and their comparative characterization is carried 
out. 
In the fifth section, anomaly detection models based on unsupervised machine 
learning algorithms are considered, the results of evaluations of these models are 
presented, and their comparative characteristics are carried out. 
 
1 Related Works 
As the [17] states, the threat of an internal intruder may come from an active 
or former employee or business partner who has or had privileges to access the 
network, system or data of the organization and who intentionally or unintentionally 
perform actions that adversely affect the confidentiality, integrity and accessibility 
of the organization or information system. 
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The main types of internal intruders, as provided in [18], are those who act 
intentionally and maliciously and those who pose a threat to the organization due to 
their inattention, negligence and the commission of inadvertent actions. As it is also 
stated in [18], the main goals and objectives of the first category include sabotage, 
intellectual property theft, espionage and financial fraud. 
Causes of threats from members of the second category are human errors, phishing, 
malware, unintentional aiding and stolen accounts. 
The threat of an internal intruder is considered as the main security problem 
of organizations [19] and according to the data given in [20] approximately 87% of 
cases of threats to the security of an organization are recorded as threats from internal 
intruders. In this paper, we will consider only cases of intentional creation of a 
security threat by an internal intruder and provide the main detection methods using 
machine learning algorithms. 
Three main categories of machine learning algorithms are used to detect the 
threat of an internal intruder: 
- supervised learning algorithms; 
- unsupervised learning algorithms; 
- anomaly detection algorithms from the group of unsupervised learning 
algorithms; 
 
1.1 Insider Threat Detection Using Supervised Learning Algorithm  
In [21], the authors conduct a comparative analysis of classifiers trained on 
the publicly available CERT Insider Threat database dataset, which is a collection 
of a large number of real cases of internal intruder threats with information about 
web and email resource traffic, as well as file system logs. As the algorithms that 
form the basis of the classifiers, such as Random Forest, k-NN, Gradient Boosting, 
Decision Trees, Logistic Regression, their variations and combinations were chosen. 
The best results were shown by classifiers based on the Random Forest algorithm 
and its variations. The achieved accuracy both on a full and on a trimmed dataset 
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ranged from 94% to 98%. However, Random Forest-based classifiers have lost in 
the speed of training to k-NN-based classifiers, which at best provide prediction 
accuracy slightly worse than the maximum accuracy in the case of Random Forest. 
A similar dataset is analyzed in [22], however, in this work, in addition to the 
Random Forest, Support Vector Machines, Decision Trees, and Logistic Regression 
algorithms, neural networks are used. A version using boosting algorithms was also 
created for each of the models, which made it possible to increase the accuracy of 
predictions for almost all the models. The results of models based on neural 
networks did not exceed the accuracy of models based on Random Forest, Decision 
Trees and Logistic Regression, while the minimum classification accuracy among 
all classifiers equaled to almost 92%. 
The work [23] stands out among the others in that the training of classifier 
models does not take place on a static dataset, but on a continuous data stream. As 
an algorithm for the classifier model, One-Class SVM is used, which, after bringing 
the training sample into the attribute space with a larger dimension, is considered as 
a regular Support Vector Machine. The method obtained 71% classification 
accuracy. 
The article [24] attempts to create a model of a multiclass classifier based on 
the k-NN algorithm for solving the two-factor authentication problem.  
The classifier predicted that a user would belong to one of four groups based 
on face recognition, which are legitimate, possibly legitimate, possibly non-
legitimate and non-legitimate. 
 
1.2 Insider Threat Detection Using Unsupervised Learning Algorithms 
This section describes the works that use unsupervised learning algorithms at 
different stages of data analysis, particularly clustering methods. 
In [25], the detection of the threat of an internal intruder is implemented using 
preliminary clustering of data based on graphs and subsequent identification of 
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anomalies. The CERT database was used as a data source. The model evaluation 
gave the best AUC score of 0.76. 
The authors of [26], use a model based on one of the varieties of deep neural 
networks, Deep Belief Networks to detect an insider threat. The dataset used is part 
of the public CERT database. The Deep Belief Network was optimized using the 
Golden Section Search algorithm, and the result of the network was used to train the 
classifier based on Support Vector Machines. The proposed method achieved 97.8% 
accuracy of detecting the threat of an internal intruder. 
Several variations of the k-means method are used by authors in [27]. The 
dataset is taken from the CERT database. The best model for anomaly detection 
achieved 76.71% accuracy with the share of a 20% rate of false-positive predictions. 
 
1.3 Anomaly-based Insider Threat Detection 
The most common methods for detecting the threat of an internal intruder are 
based on anomaly detection algorithms. In these approaches, models are most often 
trained on data that consists almost entirely or completely of examples with normal 
behavior, traffic, or other characteristics. Having trained on such data, models are 
capable of detecting examples that differ greatly in properties, which makes it 
possible to efficiently identify anomalies, particularly the threat of an internal 
intruder.  
The authors of [28] use neural networks training on vectors transformed using 
the word2vec algorithm using the UNSW-NB15 dataset that contains real examples 
of normal and synthetic examples of abnormal traffic. The optimal configuration 
resulted in a precision of 99.20%, a recall of 82.07%, and a false positive rate of 
0.61%. 
In the article [29], a dataset from the CERT database is used for research. 
Standard anomaly detection algorithms have been applied, including Isolation Forest 
and One-Class Support Vector Machines. Models are constructed in such a way that 
they analyze the dataset previously divided into parts by time cycles. In the worst 
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case, the AUC metric yielded a value of 0.87, while in all experiments, models based 
on One-Class Support Vector Machines performed better. 
One of the varieties of the CERT dataset (CERT Insider Threat v6.2) is 
analyzed to identify the threat of an internal intruder using the anomaly detection 
approach in [30]. Models are based on deep and recurrent neural networks. The best 
model on average, with a confidence of 95.53%, detects anomalies present in the 
dataset. 
Another example of the use of anomaly detection algorithms to detect the 
threat of an internal intruder is given in [31]. Authors use auto-encoders, analyzing 
the NSL-KDD dataset with information about network connections. The proposed 
method produced a detection accuracy of 91.70%. 
 
1.4 Insider Threat Detection Based on Stress Recognition 
There are works in which the insider threat detection is based on the 
assumption that when committing abnormal actions, a user who is a current or 
former employee of the organization experiences stress. Stress, in turn, affects 
biometric indicators such as heart rate, blood pressure, body temperature, as well as 
the rhythm and dynamics of keystrokes on devices that interact with the information 
system. Therefore, by identifying stress using biometric indicators, one can build the 
chain in the reverse order and with a certain degree of confidence assume that the 
stress was caused due to unlawful actions that constitute an insider threat. Such an 
assumption was made in [1,2,3,4].  
In the paper [3], the authors carry out a comprehensive study, including the 
processes of data collection, pre-processing, training of models of classifiers and 
their evaluation. As the main biometric indicators for stress monitoring, 
electrocardiogram (ECG) or electroencephalogram (EEG) signals were chosen. Of 
greatest interest is the data collection process, which uses scenarios that describe 
both the actions of an internal intruder causing a stressful state and the actions of an 
ordinary employee of a company that do not pose a security risk and do not induce 
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stress. The Support Vector Machines algorithm is selected as the basis of the 
classifier model. The proposed model achieved 86% prediction accuracy. 
  A big drawback from the point of view of practical application in [3] is the 
need for special equipment that tracks changes in biometric indicators. To solve this 
problem in the article [16], the authors use the keyboard and mouse as tracking 
sensors, which provide valuable information about the dynamics of keystrokes and 
buttons. As already shown in [10,11,12,13,14,15], the keyboard script changes under 
the influence of various emotional states. In [16], four classifier models were 
constructed based on Support Vector Machines, Random Forest, k-NN, and 
Bootstrap Aggregating. Models were trained on data collected using two categories 
of scenarios, as in [3], describing the actions of an internal intruder and an ordinary 
employee. The resulting model accuracy ranged from 67.5% to 72.5%. The authors 
attribute the poor results to a lack of informative features isolated from the dynamics 
of using the keyboard. Most of the signs were isolated from the dynamics of using 
the mouse, but the conclusions noted that the influence of stress on the dynamics is 
obvious, and this confirms the assumption that the ability to detect stress through 
biometric indicators allows you to detect the insider threat. 
The current study is in many respects similar to [16], however, there are 
significant differences in the processes of data accumulation and feature extraction, 
as well as in the used machine learning algorithms for classifier models and the 
additional use of anomaly detection algorithms. Further in the work, the terms stress 
and anomaly will be considered interchangeable to follow algorithmic terminology. 
 
2 Data Collection Process 
Due to the lack of datasets for the current study, it became necessary to 
organize data collection and create a dataset for training of classifier models and 
anomaly detection models. To do this, two categories of scenarios were invented 
that describe the actions of an internal intruder and the actions of a non-threatening 
employee. 
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Scenarios of the first category were designed in such a way that stress was 
induced in the experiment’s participant during their execution. For this, the scenarios 
of the first category, unlike the scenarios of the second category, were limited in 
time, and the actions performed by the participants of the experiment as an internal 
intruder described real situations of attacks that could arise in organizations.  
In the first scenario of this category, an internal intruder (employee or former 
employee) sits at the computer of another employee. Finds an archive with 
confidential salary information in the company. The archive is password-protected, 
but the attacker is well acquainted with the owner of the computer and has a list of 
possible passwords, one of which is guaranteed to be suitable. The unpacked archive 
contains information on the salary of each employee, which is saved as a screenshot. 
The intruder collects as much data as possible from the screenshots, combines them 
into a text document and sends them to the provided list of users by mail, entering a 
description and a subject. Wherein, it is forbidden to send screenshots instead of a 
text file, since the company’s network has a service that monitors all outgoing files 
over 20 kb. If possible, the intruder clears the browser history. 
In the second scenario of this category, the internal intruder (employee) sent 
a request for the salary increase to the chief in the form of a document. The chief 
read the letter but did not print it. While he is not in the workplace, the attacker tries 
to change the contents of the document on the chief's computer, which he left turned 
on, adding additional items to the form. The intruder enters the chief’s mail, finds 
his letter, downloads the document, deletes the letter, changes the contents of the 
document, enters his mail and sends a new letter with the changed document to the 
chief through another browser. Marks the letter in the chief's mailbox as read. If 
possible, intruder cleans history. 
In the third scenario, the intruder is the chief designer at the processor 
manufacturing company. On his computer, drawings and characteristics of the new 
processor are stored. An attacker needs to send data to competitors, but it is strictly 
forbidden to do this by copying data, creating a new document, and sending by mail, 
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as the company has a system to prevent information leaks. However, the intruder is 
aware of the flaws of the system. Every 3 hours for 4 minutes, the system archives 
the collected data, and the keylogger turns off. Using this resource to temporarily 
store text, an attacker needs to retype the characteristics there and publish. several 
posts on a page in a social network, wherein each post there will be a part of the link 
to the characteristics stored on the resource. 
The scenarios of the second category were not limited in time. These scenarios 
described the actions that an employee in the organization could perform while 
doing his job. 
In the first scenario, the employee needs to find answers to the questions 
provided in the list in the browser. Reprint the answers into the created document. 
Next, enter the mailbox using the credentials provided during the experiment. The 
email address and password are selected so that they are easy to enter to simulate an 
employee who often uses a mailbox and knows his email address and password by 
heart. It is necessary to create a new letter by attaching a file with the answers, enter 
the subject and description of the letter, a list of recipients with electronic addresses 
of varying complexity and send it. 
In the second scenario of this category, an employee works in a company with 
a large number of branches. The reporting of branches is compiled at the head office, 
and the employee, considered in the scenario, is engaged in this process. Last 
month's reports came to him in the form of tables. It is necessary to download all the 
documents from the mailbox, compose them so that the generalizing document must 
contain the fields: branch, date, income and expenses. In the last line, the employee 
calculates the sum of the fields of income and expenses. Wherein, it is forbidden to 
copy data from branch reports and all data must be entered manually. After the 
completion of the general report, the employee sends it by mail to the same branches 
with an arbitrary subject and body of the letter. 
In the third scenario, an event management company's employee received a 
letter asking him to send information about the company's achievements over the 
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previous 2 years to participate in a tender for an annual hackathon for biologists. 
Information is stored on the employee’s computer, but is scattered in several files. It 
is necessary to collect the required information from the local storage and send it in 
a response letter, after combining the collected data in the form of a document. The 
information must be reprinted, not copied. 
Due to some circumstances, only 8 people took part in the data collection 
experiment. All participants were students with an average age of 20 years. Wherein, 
all the participants executed scenarios on the same device in order to avoid the 
influence of keyboard and mouse types on data. 
Python software was written to log keyboard and mouse events during the 
execution of the scenarios. 
 
3 Feature Selection and Preprocessing 
To analyze the data on the interaction of the user with the keyboard and 
mouse, most often time and frequency features are distinguished, as in [10,11,14,16]. 
The time features that are used in the current study are graphically presented in 
Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 — schematic representation of time features [32] 
 
Lists of time and frequency features are presented below in Tables 1 and 2. 
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Table 1 — time features 
№ Name Definition 
1 dwell time time (in milliseconds) between pressing and releasing the same key 
2 flight time or down-to-down  time (in milliseconds) between pressing one key and pressing another key 
3 latency  time (in milliseconds) between pressing one key and releasing another 
key 
4 interval  time (in milliseconds) between releasing one key and pressing another 
key 
5 up-to-up  time (in milliseconds) between releasing one key and releasing another 
key 
 
Table 2 — frequency features 
№ Name Definition 
1 typing speed keys pressed or typed words per minute 
3 frequency of presses key usages per minute 
  
In contrast to the work [16], where the features were extracted more for the 
mouse, in the current study, time and frequency features, in addition to the typing 
speed, are extracted for four large groups: 
- mouse clicks; 
- special keys like backspace, del, capslock, shift, tab, alt; 
- bigrams, which are a combination of two letters of the alphabet; 
- trigrams, which are a combination of three letters of the alphabet. 
The features for the bigrams and trigrams were extracted only for the Cyrillic 
alphabet since almost all scenarios required the use of the Russian layout most of 
the time, and the Latin layout was used in extremely rare cases and not in all 
scenarios, which made the features for the bigrams and trigrams of the Latin alphabet 
uninformative due to their complete or almost complete absence in the event logs. 
Bigrams and trigrams were not chosen randomly. Selected combinations are 
the most common in Russian. About 275 million characters of text in Russian were 
used to calculate the frequencies of bigrams and trigrams [33]. Chosen bigrams and 
trigrams are presented in the Table 3. 
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Table 3 — bigrams and trigrams 
Group Elements 
bigrams ст, ен, ов, но, ни, на, ра, ко, то, ро 
trigrams ени, ост, ого, ств, ско, ста, ани, про, ест, тор 
 
Both frequency and time features were calculated using a python script. Using 
written script, for each of the log files frequency features for special keys and time 
features for all other groups including special keys were extracted. Before saving to 
the dataset, for each of the attributes of the final feature vector, except the frequency 
ones, the average value was calculated within each log file. 
The dimension of the feature space in the compiled dataset, taking into 
account some discarded features, equaled 191. Discarding features was the first step 
in the data preprocessing process, during which those features that occurred only a 
few times in all log files were excluded. These features are for right mouse button, 
caps lock, esc and alt.  
At the next stage, those features for whose values the standard deviation 
calculated separately for the categories of abnormal and normal behavior turned out 
to be less than the specified acceptable value, were removed.   
This is explained by the fact that in the big amount of samples of the dataset 
there were no values for most of the features, and if they were preserved, algorithms 
for extracting the most informative features would select features with a standard 
deviation close to zero. However, these features cannot be used to maximize the 
predictive ability of models due to the low informational content of such features. 
As a result of this rejection, the dimension of the feature space was reduced to 150. 
Since in the used scenarios the sets of occurring elements from the above 
groups are different, there were voids for some of the features in the dataset. As the 
second step of data preprocessing, these voids were filled with medians, which were 
calculated separately for the anomalous and normal categories.  
The relative distribution of feature medians for samples with normal and 
abnormal behavior is shown in Figures 2 and 3. 
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Figure 2 — relative distribution of feature medians, part 1 
 
Figure 3 — relative distribution of feature medians, part 2 
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 At the last step of the preprocessing, the Select K-Best algorithm based on 
chi-squared statistics was applied to extract the three most informative features. This 
algorithm performs a series of one-dimensional statistical tests, giving each attribute 
a certain score, according to which sorting and selection of k-best attributes take 
place. As a result, the following features were selected as the most informative ones: 
- то_interval; 
- ста_interval_first; 
- ани_interval_first. 
Reducing the dimension of the space of features to three allowed us to visualize 
the distribution of dataset samples in the space of features from various angles.  
This distribution is shown in Figure 4. 
   
Figure 4 — spatial distribution of samples 
 
4 Classifier Models and Their Evaluation 
This section summarizes the results of using supervised machine learning 
algorithms to classify normal and abnormal user behavior. 
To construct models of classifiers, the algorithms Logistic Regression, k-NN, 
Random Forest, Multi-Layer Perceptron and Gradient Boosting were chosen.  
The constructed models were trained on 49% of the entire dataset, validated 
on 21% of the dataset and were tested on the rest of the dataset. The obtained results 
are presented in Table 4. 
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Table 4 — evaluation of classifier models  
№ Algorithm Precision Not-
Stress 
(train / test) 
Precision 
Stress 
(train / test) 
Recall 
Not-Stress 
(train / test) 
Recall  
Stress 
(train / test) 
Accuracy 
(train / test) 
1 Logistic 
Regression 
1.00 / 0.70 1.00 / 0.83 1.00 / 0.88 1.00 / 0.62 1.00 / 0.75 
2 k-NN 0.92 / 0.73 1.00 / 1.00 1.00 / 1.00 0.91 / 0.62 0.95 / 0.81 
3 Random Forest 1.00 / 0.80 1.00 / 1.00 1.00 / 1.00 1.00 / 0.75 0.91 / 0.88 
4 Multi-Layer 
Perceptron 
1.00 / 0.70 1.00 / 0.83 1.00 / 0.88 1.00 / 0.62 1.00 / 0.75 
5 Gradient 
Boosting 
1.00 / 0.70 1.00 / 0.83 1.00 / 0.88 1.00 / 0.62 1.00 / 0.75 
  
 Table 4 shows that for models based on Logistic Regression, MLP and 
Gradient Boosting, the same metric values are obtained. Most likely, such a 
coincidence in the metric values occurred due to the little amount of data and 
successful spatial distribution of anomalous and normal examples in the space of 
features.  
The latter allowed all models to achieve maximum or near-maximum 
performance in the training sample. However, models based on Logistic Regression, 
MLP and Gradient Boosting showed the worst performance in the test sample. In 
the case of Logistic Regression, this could be explained by the weak predictive 
ability of this algorithm for the non-linear data distribution, as a result of which the 
model finds it difficult to catch the pattern of data distribution. And in the case of 
MLP and Gradient Boosting, such results can be explained only by an insufficient 
amount of data, since both MLP and Gradient Boosting can capture very complex 
patterns in the data. Perhaps the performance of the Logistic Regression-based 
model will be better with increasing data volume, but it is obvious that as the data 
distribution function becomes more complicated, the proportion of incorrectly 
predicted samples will increase. 
Wherein, the model based on k-NN slightly outperformed the previously 
mentioned models in terms of performance. Such results can be explained by the 
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fact that k-NN uses the distance between objects in the feature space for 
classification, and if paid attention to the location of samples with normal and 
abnormal behavior in Figure 4, it is noticeable how clear is the spatial separation. 
This separation makes it easy to determine whether an example belongs to a 
particular class. However, with the increase in the amount of data, new spatial 
clusters may appear, and the performance of the model based on k-NN can 
significantly decrease. 
The model based on the Random Forest algorithm showed the best results. 
This is explained by the design of the Random Forest algorithm, which uses a large 
number of weak classifiers, in this case, decision trees combined into an ensemble, 
which allows one to consider a large number of functions describing the distribution 
and averaging the results to obtain a significant increase in comparison with the same 
decision trees used separately. However, in this case, model overfitting could occur, 
since on the validation sample the scores are much worse than for models based on 
Logistic Regression, Gradient Boosting and MLP. 
Figure 5 presents the visualized classification results for the train and test 
samples for the best model. Visualized results for the remaining models are available 
in Appendix A. 
   
   
Figure 5 — classification results for the model based on Random Forest 
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5 Anomaly Detection Models and Their Evaluation 
This section summarizes the results of applying anomaly detection 
algorithms.  
Algorithms for detecting anomalies are based on two assumptions [29]:  
- firstly, most user behavior patterns in the system are normal with a small 
percentage of abnormal cases;  
- secondly, abnormal cases are statistically different from normal.  
Besides the fact that there is no need to label data for model training, the main 
advantage of using anomaly detection algorithms is the ability to adapt to new 
patterns of abnormal behavior. 
To construct anomaly detection models, the algorithms Isolation Forest, One-
Class Support Vector Machines, Robust Covariance and Local Outlier Factor were 
selected. Models are trained only on normal samples, the number of which is 33% 
of the total dataset. Models are tested on all the abnormal and the remainder of the 
normal samples. The results of training and testing are shown in Table 5. 
Table 5 — evaluation of anomaly detection models  
№ Algorithm Precision Not-
Stress 
(train / test) 
Precision 
Stress 
(train / test) 
Recall 
Not-Stress 
(train / test) 
Recall  
Stress 
(train / test) 
Accuracy 
(train / test) 
1 Robust 
Covariance 
1.00 / 0.60 — / 0.91 0.81 / 0.75 — / 0.83 0.81 / 0.81 
2 One-Class 
SVM 
1.00 / 0.00 — / 0.75 0.81 / 0.00 — / 1.00 0.81 / 0.75 
3 Isolation 
Forest 
1.00 / 1.00 — / 1.00 0.81 / 1.00 — / 1.00 0.81 / 1.00 
4 Local Outlier 
Factor 
1.00 / 0.88 — / 0.96 0.88 / 0.88 — / 0.96 0.88 / 0.94 
 
The model based on One-Class SVM showed the worst results without 
identifying any samples with normal behavior in the test sample. This can only be 
explained by the fact that the hyperplane separating the class with normal behavior 
was incorrectly located during the training. 
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The remaining models showed results much better than the one based on One-
Class SVM. The model based on the Local Outlier Factor in the test set showed 
results close to ideal. This is because the samples are well divided in the feature 
space, and since the idea of the Local Outlier Factor algorithm is to use spatial 
characteristics with respect to k-nearest neighbors, in this case, the algorithm was 
able to easily determine the location of the group of samples with normal behavior. 
 The model based on the Isolation Forest showed ideal metrics in a test set. 
And the possible explanation is that Isolation Forest managed to separate the 
samples as accurately as possible in the attribute space, recursively sorting through 
all possible variants of spatial sections. 
Figure 6 presents the visualized results of the model based on the Isolation 
Forest algorithm. Visualized results for the remaining models are available in 
Appendix B. 
   
   
Figure 6 — anomaly detection results for the model based on Isolation Forest 
 
Conclusions and Further Research 
 In this paper, an analysis of studies in the field of detecting the insider threat 
using various biometric indicators was carried out, and the possibility of detecting 
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anomalies by detecting stress using data from interaction with the keyboard and 
mouse was demonstrated. 
 In the course of the study, a dataset including the data of the keyboard and 
mouse logs was collected. The data collection experiment involved 8 people who 
completed scenarios that described both the actions of a normal employee and the 
actions of an internal intruder. 
 Then, using the written software, groups of time and frequency features were 
extracted from raw data. Steps to preprocess the data and extract the most 
informative features were also taken. Classifier models based on 5 different 
supervised machine learning algorithms and anomaly detection models based on 4 
unsupervised machine learning algorithms were built. The best classifier model 
achieved 88% accuracy. The best anomaly detection model achieved 100% 
accuracy. 
The study showed that under the influence of stress, the dynamics of using the 
keyboard and mouse changes significantly, which leads to an increase in the speed 
of pressing keys and buttons. The results obtained when testing the models of 
classifiers, as well as models for detecting anomalies, confirmed the assumption that 
stress detection can play a key role in detecting anomalies, one of the reasons for 
which may be an internal intruder. 
 In the further study, it is planned to collect much more data from different age 
categories of users with different keyboard usage abilities, which will allow us to 
analyze all the events on the keyboard and mouse when selecting features that were 
omitted in this study. 
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Visualized Classifier Models Results 
   
   
   
Insider Threat Detection Based on Stress Recognition Using Keystroke Dynamics 
 
 
 25 
   
   
   
   
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Insider Threat Detection Based on Stress Recognition Using Keystroke Dynamics 
 
 
 26 
Appendix B 
Visualized Anomaly Detection Models Results 
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